Showing posts with label crypto hack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crypto hack. Show all posts

A Multisig Wallet Just Lost $6.45 Million - and Not One Owner Signed a Thing

Multisig

A Gnosis Safe multisig wallet lost about $6.45 million on Monday, and the part that should worry anyone who keeps funds in one is how it happened. No owner signed the transaction. No key belonging to an owner was used. The money walked out through a permissions add-on called the Zodiac Roles module, which the wallet's own settings had authorized to move funds on its own. Blockchain security firm PeckShield flagged the drain on November 16, citing on-chain investigator Specter, and the on-chain record backs up the outline of what happened. One transaction at 11:35 UTC moved about 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC, a yield-bearing token tied to Maple Finance, out of the Safe and into a single address.

The Multisig Did Its Job. The Permissions Did Not.

A Safe wallet normally needs two owner signatures before anything moves, and that is the whole point of using one. The Zodiac Roles module is an add-on that lets owners hand out narrower permissions, so a specific address can carry out specific transactions without rounding up the owners every time. It is a convenience feature, and in this case the convenience was the door. The draining transaction went through the module's execTransactionWithRole function, not through a signed multisig transaction, and the Safe emitted an ExecutionFromModuleSuccess event for the Roles contract. The owners never approved anything because, under the setup, nobody asked them to.

Johannes Moormann, co-founder of Zodiac, told Cointelegraph his team reviewed the transaction and found nothing wrong with the contracts. "There is no vulnerability in the module. The contracts worked correctly. The transaction came from the key of a long-standing role member, which was most likely compromised," he said. Moormann added that the wallet's custom permissions policy permitted the transfer, almost certainly unintentionally, and that the wallet's operators controlled its keys and permissions while Zodiac had neither access to them nor any involvement in the setup. Safe confirmed that no wallet owner signed the transaction and that its core Safe contracts and Safe{Wallet} were not affected. The identity of the wallet's owner has still not been established, and Zodiac said it has not been in contact with the affected team.

Where the Money Went

Once the funds were out, the attacker moved fast to make them hard to follow. PeckShield reported that about $813,000 went into buying Monero-linked tokens on Hyperliquid, and blockchain analytics firm Bitquery traced funds through multiple addresses to Hyperliquid, where five accounts bought roughly $1 million in XMR1 tokens. Specter also reported about $1.2 million converted into Monero through Wagyu. Monero is built to hide the sender, receiver, and amount, so every dollar swapped into it is a dollar that gets much harder to trace or recover.

Bitquery also noted similarities between these fund movements and the flows that followed Monday's Lighter incident, including a 160 Ether transfer and purchases of XMR1 tokens. The firm was careful to add that it found no transfers connecting the two wallet groups and could not establish whether the same actor was involved. Two incidents in one day with the same laundering pattern is either a coincidence or a shared playbook, and nobody has the evidence yet to say which one it is.

This Was Not a Bug.

The usual story after a hack is a flaw in the code, a patch, and a promise to do better. This one does not fit that shape. Zodiac says the module did exactly what it was told to do, and the problem was a key that should never have had that much power combined with a policy that handed it over. A compromised key is bad enough on its own. A compromised key that can empty a multisig without a single owner signing is a setup problem, and setup problems do not get fixed by an audit of someone else's contracts.

This is also not the first time a Safe module has been at the center of an incident this year, and the pattern is worth paying attention to. Modules add power to a wallet, and every permission granted is a door that stays open until someone closes it. Anyone running a Safe with modules attached should be checking what each role key is actually allowed to do, cutting permissions down to what is genuinely needed, and treating a delegated key with the same care as an owner key. A multisig protects you from a single bad signature. It does not protect you from permissions you handed out yourself and forgot about.

So the $6.45 million did not leave because the vault was broken. It left because someone held a key to a side door, the side door was left wide open, and nobody was watching it. That is a cheaper lesson to learn from someone else's wallet than from your own.

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Author: Cedric Holloway
New York Newsroom
GlobalCryptoPress | Breaking Crypto News

Axie Infinity's Ronan Network Hack Actually WORSE Than Previously Reported - Now Crypto's 2nd Largest Crime...

Axie Infinity Hack

The amount initially reported at the time of the incident was $540 million, that has now risen to $615 million by the time of publishing this article - officially making this crypto's second-largest crime.

Discovery began when a user reported being unable to withdraw money from the Ronin bridge, already six days after the heist, Ronin Network developers detected the hack Tuesday morning.

The Ronin Network is an Ethereum side chain, largely utilized as the payment rails for the popular play-to-earn game Axie Infinity, providing game players with lower transaction fees.

The incident occurred on March 23 when the attackers used hijacked private keys to "create bogus withdrawals" through a backdoor method, emptying 173,600 ether (ETH) and 25.5 million of the stablecoin 'USD coin' according to a blog post from the Ronin network.

Validator nodes are used in blockchains to validate, vote on, and keep track of transactions. Ronin is made up of nine distinct validator nodes. Five of the nine nodes must approve a withdrawal or deposit in order for it to be recognized.

According to the Ronin Network, attackers obtained a signature by exploiting a backdoor flaw in the decentralized autonomous structure of the play-to-earn game.

“As of right now users are unable to withdraw or deposit funds to Ronin Network. Sky Mavis is committed to ensuring that all of the drained funds are recovered or reimbursed” Ronan network says.

Stolen funds were done in 2 transaction to this wallet: https://etherscan.io/address/0x098b716b8aaf21512996dc57eb0615e2383e2f96

Strange Decisions, Signs This May NOT 'Sophisticated' Hackers...

In a surprising move, some has been transferred into accounts on the crypto exchange FTX - a centralized exchange that works with law enforcement and will surely return the stolen funds it possesses. 

There's new movement on the wallet as well, it appears they're trying to use a bridge to move some of the remaining funds to another blockchain.

Limited Options...

Where could they go from here? In my opinion, every option is a bad move.. 

Mixers that scramble transactions of multiple peoples coins then spit them back out, in theory making them untraceable, do not have nearly enough liquidity to leave the hackers with any real progress.  Maybe 0.5% per day could be 'cleaned' this way.  Tracing large amounts through mixers is as simple as seeing who was sent the most at the end of the mixing process.

To use mixers to clean the dirty crypto and stay hidden would require them to do daily amounts so small the process would take decades.

Privacy coins perhaps? That won't work either.

The public data on privacy coins would also make it obvious which wallet belongs to them - they simply have too much to stay under the radar Similar to using mixers, they would need to do transactions so small if they want to stay hidden and blend in with everything else, it would take years before they could actually spend what they stole.

Worst case is the hackers maybe being able to walk away with $5 million of it in the end.  Making this an incredibly stupid decision - committing a $600 million crime, and leaving with $5 million.

In Closing...

While this may sound like a disaster for Ronin Network at the moment, software exists today used by exchanges and law enforcement capable of tracking every step these coins take.  Spending any of this in the real world will be nearly impossible. 

The things people normally do with millions of dollars, like luxury travel, homes, cars, are all things that would instantly expose the identity of the criminals.

I would bet on most or all of the funds being recovered in the neat future.

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Author: Ross Davis
Silicon Valley Newsroom
GCP | Breaking Crypto News

Crypto Thief Arrested in US After Stealing $1M+ From 75 Victims in 20 States...

Crypto news
While mainstream media reports are making this kid sound like a mastermind, the truth is, this trick takes virtually no skills whatsoever.

That's why it's so disturbing.

19 year old Yousef Selassie was arrested and charged with first-degree grand larceny and identity theft when authorities traced 75 victims back to him as he began to spend his earnings.

“He sought them out based on the industries they were involved in” said Brooklyn Assistant DA James Vinocur, explaining how Yousef targeted people in tech believing they were more likely to own high amounts of cryptocurrency.

A search of his residents found 9 phones, 3 flash drives, and 2 laptops - all containing evidence against him.  He plead not guilty.

Shockingly simple...

Authorities say he used a "SIM swap" to pull it off, and when you hear how easily this is done, it will shock you.
  • Get a blank SIM card (available on Ebay and hundreds of other sites) 
  • Put it into a cellphone.
  • Call the target's cellphone provider.
  • Pretending to be the target or someone close to them, say you recently lost your phone, you ordered a new one, and need it activated.
  • They will ask for the SIM card's ID number.
  • If everything went correctly, your phone is now on the victims account, you control their phone number, you receive their calls and texts.
  • Using the 'I lost my password' feature everything from crypto exchanges to online banking has, have them text a code to reset it.
  • Since the text messages now go to you, you're now able to reset the passwords to whatever you wish.
  • That's it, you have full access to everything. 
Some tricks used to get the customer service rep from the cell phone company to comply include pretending to be someones personal assistant, which would explain why you may not be able to answer every question they ask you.

Or, pretend to be elderly, make every step take way longer than usual, make the customer service rep frustrated and by the time they figure out what you need them to do, they'll rush to get you off the line.

Who's to blame?
Absolutely, it's the cellphone providers.  In almost every case a rep from the company doesn't go through the process of verifying they are talking to the true account owner, or, as mentioned above when they believe they're speaking with someone's personal assistant, they will forgive not knowing things like the mothers maiden name.

The solution? This can be tough, because sometimes we forget what we chose as our passwords or pins. I've never had to do this process myself, and I have no idea what answers I gave to the security questions when I signed up... 8 years ago now.

But frankly, if I forgot, it's my fault.  So perhaps a foolproof system where the customer service reps cannot change SIM information without first entering information given by the customer is the way to go. 

If they forgot, a verification code will have to be mailed to the customer's home address. It could be sent overnight (for a fee) and people will have to accept this is being done in the name of protecting their data.

These days, so much of our lives are on our phones.  It's a change that happened without much thought behind it, but most people don't feel like losing their phone is the same as losing their wallet with their credit cards in it.  But really, it's exactly like that.

Could someone call a bank and get someone else's login information by saying they are their personal assistant? Would the bank reps forgive not knowing a few pieces of personal information? Hell no.

Now keep in mind, through someones cellphone you can access that same account! That's why cellphone providers need to operate with the same security standards as the bank. 

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Author: Ross Davis
E-Mail: Ross@GlobalCryptoPress.com Twitter:@RossFM

San Francisco News Desk