Showing posts with label bitcoin security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bitcoin security. Show all posts

Anyone with a Server Running LNbits Told to SHUT DOWN After Security Hole Discovered, a Patch is in the Works…

 

LNbits tells operators to shut down after attacks

If you run an LNbits server, stop what you are doing and turn it off. On Sunday, November 8, the project behind the free, open-source Bitcoin Lightning wallet system told every operator to shut down their servers immediately, after what it called a wave of attacks. Two days later the warning is still in force, with no stable security release, no public explanation of the flaw, and no all-clear from the project. What has shown up so far is a test package not meant for production use, which is not a fix.

What happened on Sunday

The first sign of trouble came at about 12:33 UTC on Sunday, when LNbits told operators to disable its Paywall extension while it looked into a possible bug. Paywall is an add-on that charges people before they can see content, and at that point the warning looked narrow. About 80 minutes later the project widened it to every LNbits server, telling all users to stop their servers immediately, saying it had a number of security patches to push. The project also switched off its own hosted service, my.lnbits.com, promising it back within 24 hours, a target of about 17:20 UTC on Monday that came and went with no restoration notice. The escalation tells its own story: whatever the attackers found, it was not confined to one extension.

The clearest confirmed loss comes from Kevin Ravensberg, who runs the BitTipBot tipping service on Telegram. Attackers created new accounts on his LNbits server and withdrew 2,285,545 satoshis, about 0.023 bitcoin or roughly $1,700 at Sunday prices, between 09:22 and 14:00 UTC on November 8. So the attack ran for more than three hours before the first warning, and was still going when the shutdown notice landed. Ravensberg has said he will reimburse affected users himself, though the funds are frozen while the incident is sorted out. LNbits has not said how many servers were hit or how much was taken in total, and that number may never be public.

The patch is late, and the test build is not the fix

LNbits developer Ben Arc estimated on Sunday that patches should be merged and available within 24 to 48 hours, putting the expected arrival between Monday afternoon and about 14:00 UTC today. That window has now closed. What has actually appeared is a pair of security changes merged into the development branch on November 9, numbered 4310 and 4313, which tighten request forgery protection and switch off new account creation by default. A test package, version 1.7.0rc4, reached PyPI at 01:51 UTC today, after an earlier release candidate yesterday. But PyPI labels it a prerelease, still being checked before a stable release, and GitHub still lists v1.6.2 from September 18 as the latest stable version. A development merge and a release candidate are progress, but neither is a patched release operators can install and trust.

The project has not published a CVE identifier or an affected-version range, and has not publicly named the flaw or the extension that was exploited. Ravensberg has said developers confirmed which extension was used against his server, but neither he nor the project has named it in public. That leaves operators guessing whether their own setup was exposed, which is exactly the uncertainty that makes a shutdown notice the right call even when it hurts. LNbits is the accounts layer behind tipping bots, payment terminals and small checkout services, so every hour it stays down is an hour those services cannot move money.

What this does and does not mean

The shutdown notice covers LNbits servers only. It does not cover Lightning nodes, and it does not mean the Lightning Network itself is broken. The attacks hit account creation and withdrawal in LNbits, not the LND or Core Lightning software underneath it, and your regular Lightning wallet is a different thing from an LNbits server. That distinction matters, because a scare like this can convince people the whole network is unsafe when the problem is one piece of software that sits on top of it. LNbits shipped a security release in September after an audit by V12, so this is not a project that ignores security, but audits do not catch everything.

If you run an LNbits server, keep it off until the project publishes a stable patched release and says operators can restart, and trust only its official channels on that. Do not restart on a release candidate, and check your balances before you let users back in. The uncomfortable part is the timeline: the attack ran for hours before anyone was warned, and two days later the fix is still a test build. Open-source wallet software runs on trust, earned by shipping the patch, naming the flaw, and saying plainly who was affected. LNbits has not done that yet.

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Author: Rowan Marrow
Seattle Newsroom
GlobalCryptoPress | Breaking Crypto News

Bitcoin Network Holds Over $1 TRILLION In Value... and it has NEVER Been Hacked! How It's Creator Knew Attacks Would Come, and How He Prepared...

Bitcoin hacked?

Many people have speculated if there could be some way to create bitcoin's out of thin air by hacking Bitcoin transactions. But these dreams remain nothing more to this day.

In the Bitcoin white paper, Satoshi Nakamoto anticipates attackers who will want to defraud the system, knowing there is always someone greedy who wants the biggest piece of the pie.

However, the Bitcoin white paper explains why it's so unlikely we will ever see a successful hack of bitcoin (or any other type of attack)...

Thirteen years after the white paper's publication, the lessons about how difficult it would be to defraud the network remain relevant.

Amazingly - Satoshi is by all accounts, gone - yet the network has become even more secure on it's own. As the number of Bitcoin miners grows larger by the day, the idea of hacking the system becomes increasingly absurd.

"By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them. The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended." - Satoshi, Bitcoin Whitepaper

This means that a hacker would need many Bitcoin miners to create the conditions that allow to deceive most of the miners that currently work on the network.

It's impossible to give an exact number, but experts estimate a hacker wanting to manipulate Bitcoin's network would need around 1 MILLION miners running modified code to even attempt it - and we're not talking about repurposed old laptops, this would require the most modern, powerful ASIC mining rigs.

How Bitcoin's Security Improves By Itself Every Day....

The network is designed to keep as many copies of the transaction history as possible so that no one can change them, the security of Bitcoin is built on cooperation, or all the computers on the network agreeing on the time and size of a transaction.

In order for a fraudulent miner to even be allowed on the network, they would need to have a valid copy of past transactions as well.  Then they could only attempt to manipulate new transactions they initiated - because the rest of the nodes would never accept a history of new transactions that did not match their own record on the blockchain.

So, the longer Bitcoin exists, the longer the list of previous blocks gets.

What About Standard 'Cracking' Methods?

One classic method of getting past digital security is as old as computers are - cracking, simply trying one password after another.

Bitcoin has this covered as well - it uses an an encryption algorithm called as 'Sha-256' which was designed by the NSA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Take a look at this randomly generated private key, keep this in mind: 1E99423A4ED27608A15A2616A2B0E9E52CED330AC530EDCC32C8FFC6A526AEDD

After a Quadrillion Attempts, You Would Have Only a 0.68% Chance to Have Cracked it...

It's that long and random for a reason. 

Another way to look at this - you could have 1 million computers, each trying a different password every second, and it still could take up to 30,000 YEARS.

So, What Can We Conclude From All This?

First, I think it's safe to say if Bitcoin was to be the target of a hacker, only those with the highest skill levels stand a (small) chance. 

But those people know they would need to dedicate their life to the task - they also know that if they did, they'd still have less than a 1% chance of success.

So if you were in their shoes - would you risk most likely wasting your life by targeting Bitcoin?  Or would you simply continue to go for the countless other places large amounts of funds are stored, on systems you can actually get into?

The combination of time, costs, and odds would lead any reasonably intelligent person to conclude: it just isn't worth it. 

Satoshi once described hacking Bitcoin as new take on the 'gamblers ruin' scenario - where essentially, someone attempting to 'win' at hacking bitcoin is more likely to go broke first.

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Author: Ross Davis
E-Mail: Ross@GlobalCryptoPress.com

Silicon Valley Newsroom