A Multisig Wallet Just Lost $6.45 Million - and Not One Owner Signed a Thing

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Multisig

A Gnosis Safe multisig wallet lost about $6.45 million on Monday, and the part that should worry anyone who keeps funds in one is how it happened. No owner signed the transaction. No key belonging to an owner was used. The money walked out through a permissions add-on called the Zodiac Roles module, which the wallet's own settings had authorized to move funds on its own. Blockchain security firm PeckShield flagged the drain on November 16, citing on-chain investigator Specter, and the on-chain record backs up the outline of what happened. One transaction at 11:35 UTC moved about 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC, a yield-bearing token tied to Maple Finance, out of the Safe and into a single address.

The Multisig Did Its Job. The Permissions Did Not.

A Safe wallet normally needs two owner signatures before anything moves, and that is the whole point of using one. The Zodiac Roles module is an add-on that lets owners hand out narrower permissions, so a specific address can carry out specific transactions without rounding up the owners every time. It is a convenience feature, and in this case the convenience was the door. The draining transaction went through the module's execTransactionWithRole function, not through a signed multisig transaction, and the Safe emitted an ExecutionFromModuleSuccess event for the Roles contract. The owners never approved anything because, under the setup, nobody asked them to.

Johannes Moormann, co-founder of Zodiac, told Cointelegraph his team reviewed the transaction and found nothing wrong with the contracts. "There is no vulnerability in the module. The contracts worked correctly. The transaction came from the key of a long-standing role member, which was most likely compromised," he said. Moormann added that the wallet's custom permissions policy permitted the transfer, almost certainly unintentionally, and that the wallet's operators controlled its keys and permissions while Zodiac had neither access to them nor any involvement in the setup. Safe confirmed that no wallet owner signed the transaction and that its core Safe contracts and Safe{Wallet} were not affected. The identity of the wallet's owner has still not been established, and Zodiac said it has not been in contact with the affected team.

Where the Money Went

Once the funds were out, the attacker moved fast to make them hard to follow. PeckShield reported that about $813,000 went into buying Monero-linked tokens on Hyperliquid, and blockchain analytics firm Bitquery traced funds through multiple addresses to Hyperliquid, where five accounts bought roughly $1 million in XMR1 tokens. Specter also reported about $1.2 million converted into Monero through Wagyu. Monero is built to hide the sender, receiver, and amount, so every dollar swapped into it is a dollar that gets much harder to trace or recover.

Bitquery also noted similarities between these fund movements and the flows that followed Monday's Lighter incident, including a 160 Ether transfer and purchases of XMR1 tokens. The firm was careful to add that it found no transfers connecting the two wallet groups and could not establish whether the same actor was involved. Two incidents in one day with the same laundering pattern is either a coincidence or a shared playbook, and nobody has the evidence yet to say which one it is.

This Was Not a Bug.

The usual story after a hack is a flaw in the code, a patch, and a promise to do better. This one does not fit that shape. Zodiac says the module did exactly what it was told to do, and the problem was a key that should never have had that much power combined with a policy that handed it over. A compromised key is bad enough on its own. A compromised key that can empty a multisig without a single owner signing is a setup problem, and setup problems do not get fixed by an audit of someone else's contracts.

This is also not the first time a Safe module has been at the center of an incident this year, and the pattern is worth paying attention to. Modules add power to a wallet, and every permission granted is a door that stays open until someone closes it. Anyone running a Safe with modules attached should be checking what each role key is actually allowed to do, cutting permissions down to what is genuinely needed, and treating a delegated key with the same care as an owner key. A multisig protects you from a single bad signature. It does not protect you from permissions you handed out yourself and forgot about.

So the $6.45 million did not leave because the vault was broken. It left because someone held a key to a side door, the side door was left wide open, and nobody was watching it. That is a cheaper lesson to learn from someone else's wallet than from your own.

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Author: Cedric Holloway
New York Newsroom
GlobalCryptoPress | Breaking Crypto News

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